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SUMMARY
This is a book about failing miliury operations on the battlefield, that is to say
ttre non-fulfilment of assignments of military units. The problem reads as
follows: which aspects of synergy, freedom of aaion and appropriate auing Ind
been neglected by the military mÍnwgement through which their units failed in
the execuion of their mission. In six case studies land operations of both armies
of the Netherlands and the former Netherlands Indies have been examined. The
selected period 1825-1950 covers the process of transformation between the
Napoleonic warfare of encirclement and flanking and the modern instrumen-
talized warfare of 'pushing buttons'.
In succession, the Java-war (1825-1830) in the Dutch East Indies had been
exarnined, followed up with the Belgian revolution of 1830 and the Lombok
expedition of 1894, also in the Dutch East Indies. The second part of this study
firstly dealt with operations at the beginning of World War II when Íte Gerrrans
invaded The Netherlands and secondly with peace forcing actioÍts shortly after
the War when the Dutch tried to reestablish their forrrer political position in the
Indonesian archipelago and for that very re:uon military actions flared up twice.
The study of warfare can be carried out from several points of view and in the
nature of things with different intentions. Barry Strauss and Josiah Oberl focused
on antiquity and derived lessons ftom ancient warfare. The premise is that the
analysis and evaluation of ancient policy and strategy failures is a fruitftrl source
for building policy/strategy models. Perhaps the most important lesson was that
many of the wars discussed were unnesessary and, what is more, each of them
resulted in catastrophic damage of social life. The meaning of this is the
compelling requirement of a decision-making structure which has the power to
realue that going to war might not be the best solution to the nation's policy.
Great warriors and brilliant leaders have lost wars in spite of winning battles
because of their strategic illusions and failures of intellect. Strauss and Ober
made an appeal to both modern strategists and policymakers to encourage a
mind-set of intellectual habits, which has to be incorporated into ttre process of
planning and rethinking. It will lead to a course whose context and consequences
are better understood and will avoid making disastrous errors. Their emphasis
on the highest levels of grand strategy and military strategy rather than on
tactics and battles was a methodological decision. It was suggested that merely
an overall approach could give insights in the intertwined link of policy and
strategy. This link is usually critical for the outcome of war.
Eliot Cohen and John Goocir" moved the scenery of failing but competent
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mititary organizations from antiquity to a rather modern period, which is
sufficiently close to the present-day'automated battlefield'. The premise is ttrat
Western democracies shape their military organizations in important ways. In
general these networks of military people reflect the social system for which
they fight and so origins and the nature of failure depend on the political system.
In short, are they ftee states or not? Covering a period of nearly sixty years
(1915-1973), they dealt with military failures originating from incompetence
rather Íran 'misfortunes'. In their 'disaster' theory three basic kinds of failure
were developed: the failure to learn, to anticipate and to adapt. A combination
of nvo kinds of failure will result in a failure of aggregation. Aggregate failures
are not necessarily catastrophic since an ability to cope can make it possible to
redeem error. \Vhen all three kinds of military failure occur togetheÍ, cata-
strophe in the sense of serious risk of national collapse results. In their descripti-
on of five different cases Cohen and Gooch examined successively institutional
indictnents and the nature of the failure(s). To that end each case was modeled
into a matrix with a variable number of rows and columns. The rows corsists of
the relevant comflurnd levels, while the columns represents the different critical
tasks. Some of these tasks were defined as critical, while other ones are margi-
nal or catastrophic.
Cohen and Gooch claim to have developed a theory of failure. If military
comrnanders do not stick to certain distinct rules, military operatioÍrs will
stagnate. In fact these rules have to be considered as 'strict formal military
regularities'. As a matter of fact Cohen and Gooch Eave a description of military
failure categories which could be used as a scientific tool for amlyzng battle-
field processes. They scaled more or less a sequence of military failures from
marginal through catastrophic. Such scaling will yield a hierarchy of failures and
a framework built-up of well-defmed touclxtones. So the theory seems to have
much to attract, yet unfortunately Cohen and Gooch omiued to fonnulate
excellent definitions of battlefield processes. The least you might expect is a
thorough description of critical functions/taslc in military units being crucial for
reaching the set goals. Sad to relate Cohen and Gooch's meanings were not
fulfilled. However it may be, the impulse they generated to developing a 'fail-
ure-taxonomy', is in itself very useful to theory-building in the field of warfare.
Consequently we applied Cohen and Gooch's basic ideas as a useful tool for
this study. For getting to the very root of military fightings one has to describe
and analyze the decisionmaking process, which is also the essence of this book.
Once involved in battle, the original comrnander's order including his plan of
execution only rarely will be carried out. Military fights on the battlefield are
characterized by continuously correcting for drifts. In the military, organization
planning processes have been subdued to strict rules. Like ttre well-known
Strength-Weakness-Oppornrnity-Threat analysis in marketing, also the military
have their equally simple arid very effective OTVEM-procedure (Opdracht-Ter-
rein-Vijand-Eigen Middelen).'
In this research the OTVEM-model has been moulded in a model of decision

























































































put together in one coherent frarnework.
By investigating which of these elements had not been paid attention to, had
not properly been paid attention to or had not in time been paid attention to, in
the plan of execution and/or in the carrying out on the battlefield, possible
causes of failure can be discovered: indicated as military failures in this study.
These variables are supposed to have a direct influence on the fighting power:
a necessity of synergy, freedom of action and appropriate acting (efficiency).
The way managers are dealing with all those variables of our decision making
model will be both an essential indicator for their competence of military
management and an indicator for successfulness of their units.
Moreover in this study the line of an organization consisting of four levels is
taken; one political and three military echelons. The 'grand strategy', being the
politico-strategic level where expressions of national struggles unfold, will
always be the source for all military actions. The 'theater strategy' unites the
interactions of the armed forces as a whole within ttre entire ttreater of warhre,
i.e. the overall conduct of ttre strategic, the operational and the tactical level.
The basic problem concerning the solution to the research subject is to find a
way out of measuring the discrepancy benveen ttre projected battle (the standard)
and the perceived reality. It is plausible to define the subject of military failures
within the boundaries of a decision making model. This model should contain
the critical factors (critical mass) of each (military) order, regardless of the level
of management, which means that character, foÍm, time, place and relevance of
the order have been described in the model.
As already mentioned, this study includes six case-snrdies. With exception of the
German invasion, the cases examined are standard examples of political disobe-
dience to the constitutional authority of the Netherlands.
The German invasion was typically an act of international warfare, whereas the
ottrer cases can be identified either 'Imperialist war' or as 'Civil war'. The
Lombok-expedition and both the First and Second Dutch Military Action after
ttre Second World War are examples of an imperialist war. The Java-war and
the Belgian Revolution may be characterized as phenomena of civil warfare. The
immediate reason for the Java-war was an unwilling and religious fanatic who,
under the mask of Javanese nationalism, turned himself against the authorities,
meanwhile mobilizing activists for insurrection towards the colonial governïrent.
The Java-war became a symbol for lndonesian sovereignty and independency.
A good 120 years later former 'servants' pennanently challenged the languishing
feudalism. They acted as political actors who were waiting for a wrong move of
their adversary, i.e. the Dutch. And promptly the Dutch made serious mistakes,
even twice. They lost patience and initiated war. A good 50 years earlier, an
almost identical affair, although on a smaller scale, had taken place on the isle
of Lombok. The extremely challenging conduct of the Balinese-Hindustani
executives, being in search of political and cultural autonomy, resulted in a
military expedition set up by the Dutch towards the Balinese rebels.
The question is now how the aforesaid discrepancy between the standard and
369
the perceived reatity was 'measured'. To that end we accentuated the concept of
efficiency, being the dominant parameter for trying out the organization's
effectiveness. This concept of efficiency has been built up on four pillars:
> the techno-economic component (optimizing the sacrificed resources);
> the psycho-social component (maximizing ttre motivation of the system-
members);
> the external social component, which has to do with ttre demands coming up
from the society (maximizing the conftontation between the suppliers -
political and military power- and the demanders -civil power);
> the management component (basically in their role of strategic decision
makers).
The methodology we used gave us the opportunity to solve the problem and to
determine -in general- that the inadequacy of the socio-political analysis of
societies with which the Dutch are dealing, lay at the root of the failures of the
Dutch strategic management. They failed to cope more effectively with revoluti-
onary movements and their mental programming. As a result the responsible
Dutch leaders made wrong estimates about ttre opponent's force and neglected
the enemy's intentions. Consequently it initiated a chain of 'failures to adapt'
and the results were dramatic. Most of these failures to adapt as well as to
anticipate can be attributed to the so-called middleline. So the necessary joining
of the strategic apex to ttre operating core by the chain of middle-line managers
was disconnected.
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